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Abstract
We show why a shopping mall prefers to provide parking for free and embed the
parking costs in the prices of the goods. This holds if the mall has monopoly power or
prices competitively; if there is parking validation or a trade-o¤ between shopping and
parking spaces. It is also the second-best social optimum. Generally, the equilibrium
lot size is too small, yielding a rationale for minimum parking requirements. In urban
malls, parking fees may be positive because individuals can use the lot without intend-
ing to shop, and lots may become too large because of the trade-o¤ between shopping
and parking spaces.
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1 Introduction
The average Joe does not think much about parking, but economists should. Other than
money and credit cards, parking is probably the most important intermediate good in the
modern economy. Needless to say, it consumes a vast quantity of natural resources. The
total amount of land devoted to parking in the US would cover several New England states
(Jakle and Sculle, 2004, pp. 1-2). And the price put on this commodity is very low. The
US Department of Transportation (1990) found that parking was free for 99% of car trips.
Shopping malls are one of the largest contributors to the stock of parking spaces. There are
over 100,000 shopping malls in the US. A typical shopping mall has 4-6 parking spaces per
1,000 sq. ft. of gross leasable area, suggesting that the average mall has more space allocated
to parking than stores (International Council of Shopping Centers and Urban Land Institute,
2003; henceforth, ICSC and ULI, 2003). More interestingly, in the same survey, 94% of the
malls reported that they charged no fee for parking and 4% did not respond to this question.
Thus, we can only be sure that 2% of these parking spaces have any fee whatsoever. Shoup
(2005) estimates the cost of a parking space in the US to be at least $125 a month. He then
asks, if parking costs so much, why is it usually free?
Based on these gures, the current literature nds parking too cheap and its quantity
too high, especially given the negative externalities from congestion and the air pollution
produced by parking. This research focuses mainly on urban areas where these negative
externalities are most severe. There has also been increasing attention to minimum parking
requirements which a¤ect land use by forcing property developers to allocate certain amounts
of land for parking (van Ommeren and Wentink, forthcoming). Many towns and cities
continue to impose these requirements even though no one knows where they come from or
what they are based on (Shoup, 1999, 2005, 2006). Is underpricing an issue for all forms
of parking? Are minimum parking requirements unnecessary or irrational as put forward
by some economists and urban planners, or are they justied for some land uses? Our
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paper nds that parking is priced properly in shopping malls, that both society and the
shopping mall want parking to be free, and furthermore that society generally wants to
require minimum parking lot sizes.
Our contribution to the literature begins by noting that there are three parties in the
parking problem, one of which previous research has not analyzed. These parties are the
customer, the primary demander of parking; the parking lot, the supplier; and the store,
which acts as a secondary demander for parking. Because stores rely on parking for business,
they are vitally concerned with how much parking is available and its price. Most of the
literature on economics of parking focuses on the customers and the negative externalities
they impose on each other by parking. Some papers notably Arnott (2006) and Arnott and
Rowse (2009b) focus on the incentives of the parking lot provider; but no paper combines
all three parties.
This paper is a rst analysis of the shopping mall parking problem. What makes shopping
mall parking an interesting research question is that the parking provider and the stores are
combined into one economic entity. This simplies the analysis of the optimal price and
quantity of parking. Shopping malls have two methods to charge customers for parking.
They can raise either the price of the good or the parking fee to absorb the costs of parking.
What we nd is that both the shopping mall and society want the price of the good to absorb
the entire cost of parking. Moreover, a social planner always wants the mall to provide more
than the prot-maximizing amount of parking. This justies the common implementation
of minimum parking requirements. To our knowledge, ours is the rst attempt to explain
the foundations of minimum parking requirements.1
The key to our analysis is recognizing that sometimes shoppers do not nd what they
want. We do not argue that this is the normal outcome, merely that it occurs. For example,
1Arnott (2006) discusses potential e¤ects of minimum (and maximum) parking requirements and van
Ommeren and Wentink (forthcoming) quantify the welfare loss caused by them, but they do not focus on
explaining their rationale.
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one of the authors is still searching for a footstool high enough for his son. The other authors
wife went to seven di¤erent malls before buying a dress to wear to a wedding. When this
outcome is possible, charging a parking fee to risk-averse customers is like charging them for
losing a lottery. Thus, both the mall and society prefer to have the cost of parking embedded
in the price of the goods. In fact, the mall would like to fully insure the marginal customer,
who is indi¤erent between visiting and not visiting the mall, but this would require negative
parking fees and is not implementable. This result holds as long as customers are risk averse,
but the degree of risk aversion does not matter. Thus, it holds no matther how small the
good is relative to the customers wealth. It is also quite robust. It holds if the shopping
mall has monopoly power or prices competitively. It holds even if we allow the shopping mall
to provide parking vouchers or if it faces a trade-o¤ between the space devoted to shopping
and to parking.
We derive these results in a model where a monopolist shopping mall sells one good to
homogeneous customers. We treat the shopping mall as a monopolist because we want to
avoid competitive explanations for free parking. A standard result is that prices decrease
in the face of competition; thus if we nd parking is free for a monopolist then we expect
that it will be free for a shopping mall in a competitive environment. We verify this in a
reduced-form competitive variation of our model. Furthermore, notice that the shopping
malls goal is not to insure the customer. Like the principle-agent model with moral hazard,
it simply nds that insuring the customer maximizes its prots. In addition, although in
our model we have homogeneous customers and one good, we are not arguing that every
customer faces this uncertainty. Rather, what is important for our argument is that the
marginal customer does, or, if there are heterogeneous goods, then the customer faces this
uncertainty with regard to some of the goods he would like to purchase.
ICSC and ULI (2003) reported that shopping malls that charge for parking are mostly
located in large urban areas. In keeping with the survey ndings, our results change when
we look at an urban mall. We dene a shopping mall as suburban if the only reason to use
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the parking lot of the mall is to shop at the mall; otherwise it is urban. In suburban malls,
parking is an intermediary for transactions in the mall. It does not interfere with tra¢ c and
there is no signicant land allocation trade-o¤ between lot size and shopping space. So, the
parking fee can be embedded into the price of the good. In urban malls, however, parking is
more like a commodity and thus should be priced independently, which means that the mall
begins behaving like a parking garage. In maximizing prot, the urban mall has to balance
providing insurance to shoppers with trying to extract surplus from non-shoppers as well.
This results in positive parking fees if the latter motive dominates.
The second crucial di¤erence of the urban mall is the land allocation trade-o¤ that
prevents the mall from expanding the parking lot without shrinking the size of the store
space. In such environments, it is no longer clear that society wants a larger parking lot
than the shopping mall. This may explain why some large cities and smaller towns in the US,
such as San Francisco, Seattle, San Antonio, Portland, Oregon, Cambridge (Massachusetts),
Redmond (Washington), Queen Cree (Arizona), and Concord (North Carolina) have begun
also regulating the maximum parking lot size. The UK also started imposing maximum
parking requirements throughout the country, most likely because land allocation trade-o¤
is more intense in an island country.
A small but rapidly growing literature in economics deals with parking. One group of
papers focuses on the price of parking, while a relatively smaller group looks at land use and
parking requirements. To our knowledge, no paper in the literature analyzes the economics
of shopping mall parking. The whole literature is shaped by Vickreys (1954) idea of pricing
parking at its social opportunity cost, just like any other commodity. Prominent books on
urban transportation, such as Arnott, Rave, and Schob (2005) and Small and Verhoef (2007),
provides signicant coverage of underpricing of parking in urban areas that results largely
from cruising for parking. Perhaps the most inuential work in both parking pricing and
land use is Shoup (2005), which underlines the high cost of free parking in all of its modes.
While it is undoubtable that parking has high social costs, we argue that it may be better
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for society to reect these costs in the price of goods.
Early work focuses on how congestion externalities inuence parking fees. Glazer and
Niskanen (1992) point out that hourly parking fees may increase congestion by causing
shorter parking durations. Building on Vickreys bottleneck model (1969), Arnott, de Palma,
and Lindsey (1991) analyze the optimal temporal-spatial dispersion of parking fees and de-
rive the prices that eliminate queuing and induce drivers to park at the most distant parking
spaces rst. Anderson and de Palma (2004) build on similar arguments in a linear-city model
and nd that the optimal price can be attained if parking is priced in a monopolistically com-
petitive fashion. Anderson and de Palma (2007) show that the same result holds even when
they endogenize land use. Arnott and Rowse (1999) consider a circular city and nd that
the optimal fee is equal to the externality imposed, but because there are multiple equilibria,
the optimal parking fee may not work since tra¢ c may end up at the bad equilibrium.
A recent surge of work elaborates on cruising for parking. Arnott and Inci (2006) nd the
optimal fees and quantity of on-street parking to eliminate cruising for parking, and Arnott
and Inci (2010) analyze the transient dynamics of downtown parking and tra¢ c in a similar
model. Arnott and Rowse (2009b) consider the optimal on-street parking capacity when
parking garages compete with on-street parking. Arnott and Rowse (2009a) further extend
this model to allow for heterogeneity in parking duration and value of time, and analyze
the imposition of parking time limits. Building on Calthrop (2001), Calthrop and Proost
(2006) analyze the optimal parking fee when both on- and o¤-street parking are available.
They nd that the on-street parking fee should be set at the marginal cost of o¤-street
parking. Arnott and Rowse (2009b) include in this equalization that the prices should be
adjusted by the cruising necessary to nd on-street parking. On the empirical side, van
Ommeren, Wentink, and Dekkers (2011) estimate the cost of cruising in Amsterdam, and
using a nation-wide dataset, van Ommeren, Wentink, and Rietweld (forthcoming) provide
comprehensive descriptive information on cruising for parking and its determinants in the
Netherlands.
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Arbatskaya, Mukhopadhaya, and Rasmusen (2009) provide another rationale for why
parking lots in shopping malls are so large and why this may be socially desirable. The basic
insight is that if the demand for parking will be higher than supply by a small amount, the
welfare loss from this situation is not limited to a few drivers being unable to nd a parking
space. In such a situation, all drivers will preemptively arrive early to avoid being shut out
of the parking lot, and as a result welfare will signicantly decrease. This e¤ect is similar to
Vickrey (1969), in which drivers arrive early to the bottleneck to avoid the delay.
There is relatively little analysis of the optimal lot size for o¤-street parking. Arnott
(2006) derives the capacity chosen by parking garages and considers the potential e¤ects
of minimum and maximum parking requirements. In practice, determining the minimal lot
size is at best an ad-hoc practice. Shoup (1999, 2005) rightfully criticizes minimum parking
requirements because no one knows the criteria behind them or whether they are appropriate
for a particular development. Shoup (1999) reports fromWillsons (1996) survey of 144 plan-
ning directors: two of the most frequently used methods in setting the parking requirements
are surveying nearby cities and consulting the handbooks of Institute of Transportation En-
gineers. This leads him to conclude that minimum parking requirements distort land use
and to recommend eliminating them for all land uses. We show that they are well justied
and could be structurally based for shopping mall lots.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the base model, derives the equilib-
rium and socially optimal parking fees followed by a discussion of parking validation and a
competitive variation of the model. Section 3 modies the base model to analyze the lot size
in equilibrium as well as the social optimum. Section 4 discusses two urban complications:
the possibility of free riding on parking spaces and land allocation trade-o¤ between lot size
and shopping space. Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains a proof and a discussion of
two alternative specications of the model.
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2 The Parking Fee
We start o¤ by describing the base model, which we shall extend in various ways in the next
sections. A risk-neutral monopolist shopping mall sells one good, which has no cost, at a
non-negative price of P . The only way to reach the mall is by car, and thus the mall has to
provide parking spaces for incoming customers, which costs c > 0 per unit of parking. The
parking fee is denoted by t. Both P and t are determined by the mall and both of them are
common knowledge.2
There are also strictly risk-averse customers whose utility function is represented by u ()
with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. All customers have the same initial wealth of w > 0 and the
reservation value of not visiting the mall of r > 0. The reservation value represents the
savings in fuel and time from not shopping plus the value of the activity that customers can
engage in instead of shopping. Each customer either purchases one or zero units of the good.
The value of the good to a customer is v, which has the common knowledge distribution
F (v) with support [0; v] and density f (v) > 0. We assume that F (v) has the standard
monotone hazard rate property or that f (v) = (1  F (v)) is increasing. We also assume that
v is high enough to cover the malls costs. In particular, if the mall provides parking only
for the highest type, then it makes a strictly positive prot on that type. This is su¢ cient
for the mall to exist.
The critical innovation in our model is that when customers go shopping they do not
always nd the good that they want. Sometimes a customer searches all day and, in the
end, leaves empty-handed. We represent this by saying that the probability that the good
sold at the shopping mall is the customers desired good is  2 (0; 1). Formally, this means
that with probability  the customer realizes that the good has value v and purchases it if
v  P , and with probability 1    the good has a value of zero and the customer does not
2In reality, the mall generally does not own any of the stores in the mall and does not directly sell the
goods itself. However, the stores almost certainly have a strong input into the parking fee; thus treating the
mall owner and the stores as separate entities is an unnecessary complication for our purposes.
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purchase it.
2.1 Equilibrium
Having described the economic environment, we are now in a position to calculate the equi-
librium parking fee o¤ered by the mall. Consider rst the customers problem. If he does
not go to the shopping mall, he gets his reservation utility u (w + r) with certainty. There
are, however, two possibilities if he goes to the shopping mall. He gets v   P if it turns
out that the good sold at the shopping mall is his desired good, but he also has to pay a
parking fee of t. As a result, his utility in this case is u (w + v   P   t), which is realized
with probability . On the other hand, he gets zero if it turns out that the good sold at the
shopping mall is not his desired good, and he still has to pay the parking fee. As a result,
his utility in this case is u (w   t), which is realized with probability 1   . Consequently,
the expected utility of visiting the shopping mall, E (ujP; t), is
E (ujP; t) = u (w + v   P   t) + (1  )u (w   t) : (1)
A customer visits the shopping mall if his expected utility of doing so is at least as high
as his reservation utility: E (ujP; t)  u (w + r), which denes the (unique) value of the good
to the marginal customer who is indi¤erent between visiting and not visiting the shopping
mall, ~v (P; t):
~v (P; t)  u 1

u (w + r)  (1  )u (w   t)


  w + P + t: (2)
Note, for future reference, that3
~vP = 1 and ~vt =
(1  )u0 (w   t)
u0 (w + ~v   P   t) + 1 
1

: (3)
3Here and throughout the paper, we write xy for @x=@y.
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Consider now the malls problem. A customer who visits the shopping mall buys a good
with probability , yielding an expected payo¤ of P to the mall. In addition, it collects t
from each customer who visits the shopping mall, but it costs c to provide a parking space
for each of them. Thus, the payo¤ of the mall per customer is P + t   c. Given that
there are 1   F (~v (P; t)) such customers visiting the shopping mall, the malls objective is
to maximize
 (P; t) = [1  F (~v)] (P + t  c) (4)
subject to the rationality constraint P + t  c  0, which ensures that it is optimal for the
mall to operate the business, and the non-negativity constraint P  0, which ensures the
non-negativity of the price of the good. At this point, we do not require t to be non-negative
because it might be optimal for the mall to subsidize parking. In fact, this will turn out to
be the case.
The objective function of the mall is concave. Ignoring the rationality and non-negativity
constraints for the moment, the rst-order conditions of the problem are
P =  f (~v) ~vP (P + t  c) + (1  F (~v))  (5)
t =  f (~v) ~vt (P + t  c) + (1  F (~v)) : (6)
If both rst-order conditions are zero, then we can eliminate the terms related to the dis-
tribution of customersvaluations by combining the two rst-order conditions. Then, the
solution of the problem is characterized only by the properties of the marginal customer,
to whom the mall would like to provide no surplus. This is summarized in the following
relation.
~vP

= ~vt: (7)
Notice that ~vP= = 1=, which is the lower bound for ~vt. To reach this lower bound, one can
see from the equation for ~vt (equation 3) that P = ~v, or that the price of the good is equal
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to the valuation of the marginal customer. Putting this condition into equation 2 yields
t =  r.
It is optimal for the mall to fully insure the marginal customer for the risk that he is
taking by searching for the good at the mall. This solution requires the mall to subsidize
parking even when the customer does not buy the good, which makes the implementation of
such pricing practically impossible. Otherwise, anyone who shows up at the shopping mall
can claim that the good is not his desired good and enjoy the parking subsidy. This means
that we have to look for a constrained solution in which the parking fee cannot be negative.
This requires adding yet another non-negativity constraint to the maximization problem,
t  0.
The characterization of the constrained solution is easy and entails the free provision of
parking, t = 0. We know that the monopolist mall provides the marginal customer nothing
more than his reservation utility, which implies that whatever the marginal customer gets
in equilibrium must have a certainty equivalent of u (w + r). However, the mall cannot fully
insure him this time because full insurance requires subsidizing parking, which is ruled out
by the inequality constraint t  0. Nonetheless, it can still employ a pricing scheme that
gives the customer an expected utility of u (w + r). As a result, the equilibrium price of the
good can be derived from
P  =
1  F (~v)
f (~v)
+
c

: (8)
The left-hand side of this expression is strictly increasing in P and the right-hand side is
weakly decreasing; thus there exists a unique P . The rst term on the right-hand side is
the standard monopoly mark-up in this type of a model. The second term guarantees that
revenue is higher than costs. This discussion leads to our rst important result.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium parking fee) Free provision of parking is the unique equi-
librium.
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Notice that this result depends only on customers being risk averse; the degree of risk
aversion does not matter. Thus, it holds even when the good is small relative to the cus-
tomers wealth level. Moreover, risk-neutral customers with a binding time constraint behave
as if they were risk averse (see, for example, Drewianka (2008) and the references therein).
It is also noteworthy that, since there are no administrative or operational costs related to
collecting parking fees in the model, parking is not free because the mall nds these costs
important and thus bundles them in the price of the good. Finally, notice that only the
marginal customers have to have  < 1. If there are some customers who are certain to
get what they want, they are indi¤erent between paying parking fees and having the fee
embedded in the price of the good. The marginal customers will cause the mall to set the
parking fee at zero, even in very large malls.
A graphical analysis of the solution is given in Figure 1. The payo¤s to customers when
they buy the good are shown on the y-axis and when they do not on the x-axis. The
indi¤erence curve of the marginal customer in equilibrium is represented by I1, which gives
him a utility level of u (w + r). The indi¤erence curves of all other customers who visit the
shopping mall are lined up in the shaded area. We also show two iso-prot lines of the mall,
one passing through the full insurance point and another through the equilibrium point,
which are denoted by 1 and 01, respectively. Note that 1 is associated with a higher
prot level for the mall than 01 since it is much closer to the origin, and thus it leaves lower
payo¤s to the customer in case of full insurance.The 45-line, or the certainty line, gives
the set of all o¤ers on which the customer gets the same payo¤ in both states of the world
(i.e., when he ends up buying the good and when he does not).
The key to the unconstrained solution is that the mall is risk neutral whereas customers
are risk averse, which means that it is optimal for the mall to o¤er a price for the good and
a parking fee pair such that the marginal customer ends up at point A in Figure 1, where
he gets the same payo¤ in both states. In this solution, the marginal customer is indi¤erent
between visiting the shopping mall and not, and all other customers in the shaded area earn
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Figure 1: Free Provision of Parking
rent. The prot of the mall is represented by the iso-prot line 1 in this unconstrained
solution. As explained before, this solution is not implementable in practice because it
requires subsidizing parking whether the customer buys a good or not.
In the constrained solution, we impose the restriction that the parking fee cannot be
negative. In any such solution, the maximum attainable payo¤ of the customer when he
does not buy the good is w. Among all these solutions, the best one in terms of prots is
point B, which gives the marginal customer the maximum attainable payo¤ when he does
not buy the good, and the corresponding payo¤ represented by the y-axis of point B when he
buys it. In this constrained solution, as in the unconstrained solution, the marginal customer
gets an expected utility of u (w + r) since he is still on the same indi¤erence curve. Yet, the
prot of the mall is now lower since it moves from the iso-prot line 1 to the iso-prot line
01.
Some comments on the robustness of our model specications are in order. First, our
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results hold for any degree of risk aversion. So, as previously mentioned, the results hold
no matter how small the good is relative to the customers wealth. Second, for ease of
explication, we call  the customers probability of nding his desired good; however, one
can interpret  more broadly as the probability of purchase. In that case, even when the
customer is certain to nd his desired good at the mall (e.g., an exact brand of an LCD TV),
he might not purchase it right away, and thus his probability of purchase is less than one.
Third, allowing for some number of customers with  = 1 does not alter our results as long
as the probability of purchase in the aggregate is less than one from the perspective of the
mall. That is, the mall looks at the marginal customer who will almost always have  < 1.
Fourth, the implications of the model are the same if customers buy a bundle of goods, some
of which are sure to be found in the mall (e.g., toothpaste or bread), as long as at least one
good is not found with a probability of one. In all of these cases, in trying to maximize its
prots, the mall has incentive to provide insuranceto the customers for the risk they face
by searching for the good at the mall.
2.2 Welfare
Since we have found that the mall prefers providing parking for free, the natural next question
is whether a social planner agrees. We assume that the social planner maximizes total welfare,
W (P; t), dened as the sum of customersnet utility, U (P; t), and the malls prot dened
in equation 4. Therefore,
W (P; t) = U (P; t) +  (P; t) ; (9)
where U (P; t) is the integration (over the valuations of customers) of the maximum of cus-
tomers expected utility from visiting the mall and his reservation utility:
U (P; t) =
Z v
0
max [E (ujP; t) ; u (w + r)] dF (v) ; (10)
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where E (ujP; t) is given in equation 1.
The derivative of total welfare with respect to t is
Wt =
Z v
~v
EtdF (v) + t: (11)
It is easy to nd the sign of this derivative. As we have shown above, t is negative for
all P and t  0. Moreover, customers do not like fees since Et =   (1  )u0 (w   t)  
u0 (w + v   P   t) < 0. Thus, Wt < 0 and the socially optimal parking fee is also equal to
zero.
This is, of course, the social optimum in a second-best sense. By removing the constraint
t  0, we can nd the rst-best parking fee and show that it is less than  r. The derivative
of total welfare with respect to P is
WP =
Z v
~v
EPdF (v) + P ; (12)
where EP =  u0 (w + v   P   t) < 0. This means that, in the unconstrained equilibrium
(which requires P = t = 0), bothWP andWt are negative, meaning that both the price of
the good and the parking fee of the unconstrained solution (t =  r) are too high. Therefore,
the rst-best social optimum requires subsidizing free parking, but for the reasons explained
in the malls problem, such a solution is not implementable. This leads to the second-best
optimum in which parking is free. We record the results of this discussion in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Social optimum) Free provision of parking is socially optimal in a second-
best sense, but the price of the good that the mall charges is too high because of its monopoly
power.
One may notice that this welfare analysis does not include the social costs of parking.
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Shoup (2005) argues that the high cost of parking is due to social costs that stem from
congestion and pollution externalities. One may be tempted to think that such social costs
may encourage the social planner to charge positive parking fees. After all, it is the shopping
(which always results in parking) that causes the social costs, not the purchasing. However,
it turns out that this is not the case. When society has two ways of covering the costs of
parking, it would rather have the price of the good absorb the costs (both private and social)
rather than impose a direct parking fee.
To facilitate this idea, let the social costs of demand be SC (Q), where Q = 1   F (~v)
and modify the welfare function as follows:
W (P; t) = U (P; t) +  (P; t)  SC (1  F (~v)) : (13)
The rst-order conditions of welfare maximization are
WP =
Z v
~v
EPdF (v)  f (~v) ~vP (P + t  c  SC 0) + (1  F (~v))  (14)
Wt =
Z v
~v
EtdF (v)  f (~v) ~vt (P + t  c  SC 0) + 1  F (~v) : (15)
Both conditions are satised when
 R v
~v
EtdF (v) + 1  F (~v)R v
~v
EP

dF (v) + 1  F (~v)
!
~vP

= ~vt: (16)
This expression di¤ers from the one in equation 7 only by the term in the large paren-
thesis, which can be shown to be smaller than one. This implies that ~vP= > ~vt, and since
~vP = 1, we have 1= > ~vt. On the other hand, we also know that ~vt  1=. Thus, we have a
contradiction, and the socially optimal parking fee is its lower bound, zero.
From equation 16 one can see that, as long as the cost of parking is a constant marginal
cost, free parking will be socially optimal in a more general environment. For example,
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if there were heterogeneous customers who each wanted only one of a set of goods, then
welfare could be expressed as the sum of welfare for each good, and the results above would
immediately generalize. The most di¢ cult case would be if customers were homogeneous
but wanted to buy multiple individually priced goods. This would give rise to interesting
cross subsidization issues which goods price should bear the brunt of the cost of parking?
However, we believe that the socially optimal parking fee would still be zero. From these two
cases, we can proceed to general demand curves. We also expect that these results would
continue to hold for more general cost functions.
2.3 Parking validation
The reader might be disturbed by the inequity of free parking in our model. After all,
everyone who comes to the shopping mall raises the costs of the mall. Why do some get o¤
without paying for it? Perhaps if the mall used parking vouchers, this would give the mall
an incentive to charge non-buyers a fee. However, it turns out that parking vouchers do not
change the malls incentives. It may now either subsidize buyers for parking or not charge
them at all, but non-buyers will still park for free. This means that free provision of parking
is one of the equilibria even when validation is allowed. More importantly, if there were
transaction costs associated with collecting the parking fees in the model, free provision of
parking would be the only equilibrium. As a matter of fact, ICSC and ULI (2003) report
that 86 percent of the shopping malls do not have a parking validation program.
In a parking validation system, customers are allowed to validate the receipt of the good
that they buy when they are leaving the parking lot. This allows the mall to charge a
di¤erent parking fee to the customers who buy a good than those who do not. Let the
parking fee when a customer buys a good be tb and that when he does not be tnb. Now, the
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marginal customers valuation is given by4
~v (P; tb; tnb)  u 1

u (w + r)  (1  )u (w   tnb)


  w + P + tb: (17)
Note that ~vP = ~vtb = 1, and ~vtnb = ((1  ) =)u0 (w   tnb) =u0 (w + ~v   P   t)  (1  ) =.
The malls maximization problem when we allow for validation is
max
P;tb;tnb
f(1  F (~v)) (P + tb + (1  ) tnb   c)g : (18)
By setting the rst-order conditions with respect to P and tnb to zero, we get ((1  ) =)~vP =
~vtnb . Again, the right-hand side is the lower bound for ~vtnb and t

nb =  r, but as before this
solution is not implementable and thus tnb = 0. Customers would not validate their parking
if tb > tnb, so we can conclude that tb  0, or, in words, the mall prefers either to subsidize
buyersparking or to provide them parking for free.
The price of the good and the parking fee for buyers are not uniquely determined this
time:
P  + tb =
1  F (~v)
f (~v)
+
c

: (19)
However, the equilibrium payo¤s will always be as in the base model. All solutions are
represented by point B in Figure 1. The mall may want to subsidize buyersparking, but if
it does so, this subsidy will increase the price of the good in a one-to-one ratio. That is, it
may appear to be helping out the buyers, but it is indeed just transferring a fee between the
two prices. The following proposition summarizes our ndings.
Proposition 3 (Parking validation) Free provision of parking is an equilibrium even when
4In this section and in the rest of the paper, we uniformly use the same notation of the base model: ~v
for valuation of the marginal customer,  for prot of the mall, U for sum of customersnet utility, and W
for total welfare. We are not going to distinguish notation in di¤erent models even when, for example, the
valuation of the marginal customer is given by a di¤erent expression than the one in the base model. We
shall, however, use superscripts or decorations whenever we think that keeping the same notation can be
confusing.
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parking validation is allowed. The mall can either charge no parking fees at all or provide free
parking to those who do not validate their tickets while subsidizing the rest upon validation.
Notice that one solution of parking validation is tb = t

nb = 0, the solution we found in the
base model. More interestingly, if there are any transaction costs associated with collecting
the parking fees such as administrative or operational costs, this solution becomes the only
solution. This explains why validation programs are so infrequent in shopping malls.
2.4 Competitive pricing
The reader may also be concerned that the results depend on the mall being a monopolist.
Perhaps if it were not able to extract supranormal prots with the price of the good, it would
be optimal to try to extract some surplus through a parking fee. We can partially respond
to this concern by assuming that the price of the good is determined competitively (i.e., it is
not a function of demand). To do this, we can assume that the shopping mall has more than
one store that o¤ers the same good, and that the stores are Bertrand competitors. This, one
should notice, is actually closer to a proper model of a shopping mall where the mall does
not own the stores.5
Assume that the mall requires a prot of  > 0 per customer. Optimizing over  would
be the same as optimizing over P + t   c, so we do not want to optimize over this value.
Instead, we assume that it is xed, perhaps as a result of competition with other shopping
malls in the area. The outside option of visiting other shopping malls could, in a reduced
form, be part of what determines r the reservation value of not visiting the given mall.
The exact size of  is not important for our analysis as long as it is strictly positive.
Formally, the mall can determine the parking fee, t, and charge the stores a per-customer
5Another natural way of modeling competition is to introduce spatial competition between shopping
malls as in Anderson and de Palma (2004), Arnott (2006), and Arnott and Rowse (2009). In such a model,
however, the shopping mall is a local monopolist, and this is closer to our base model.
19
fee,  =  + c   t. The stores then compete by choosing their prices, resulting in an
equilibrium price of the good of P = = due to Bertrand competition. The mall, then,
maximizes its prot given by
 (; t) = (1  F (~v)); (20)
where ~v is the same as in equation 2.
The constraints for this model are P = = and t  0. After simplifying the analysis by
replacing P by =, we get
t = f (~v)

~vP

  ~vt

: (21)
This expression is strictly negative, implying that the equilibrium parking fee is zero. To see
this, notice that if ~v > P then ~vP= < ~vt, and ~v > P if t  0. Thus, the equilibrium t is
zero. The following proposition records this result.
Proposition 4 (Competitive pricing) Free provision of parking is an equilibrium even
when the price of the good is set competitively.
3 Parking Lot Size
We now extend the base model to analyze the equilibrium size of a parking lot. In the base
model, the equilibrium size is just enough to meet total demand. In order to make parking
lot size a meaningful choice variable, demand must vary, which would then allow the mall to
choose between having a very large lot that is rarely used or a very small one that is usually
full. The ICSC and ULI (2003) survey strongly supports that demand varies. It inquired
if and when the lots are at capacity, and 43% responded that it never was. Of those who
reported that the lot was sometimes full, the times this occurred were on weekends, holidays,
days before forecasted snow, back-to-school sales, and the Christmas shopping season.
Motivated by the survey ndings, we assume that the total possible demand, M , is a
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random variable with distribution G (M) and density g (M) for M 2 M; M where M >
0. Therefore, the base model is just a special case in which M = 1. To assure (local)
concavity of the malls prot function and uniqueness of the equilibrium, in addition to the
monotone hazard rate property of the distribution of v, we impose that the hazard rate of
the distribution of M , g (M) = (1 G (M)), is higher than 1=M for all M 2 M; M.
We assume that the price of the good, the parking fee, and the lot size have to be
determined before M is realized and thus cannot depend on M . This assumption is clearly
very reasonable for both the parking fee and the lot size. As for the price of the good, while
much of the variation in the ICSC and ULI (2003) survey is predictable, most of the time
either price does not vary or it varies inversely with M (such as discounts during the high
demand season of Christmas), which clearly signals that the price of the good is somewhat
orthogonal toM , that is, determined largely by something other thanM . Hence, we believe
that our assumption is reasonable for the price of the good, too.
The parking lot size is denoted by l. Customers know both their valuations of the
good and total possible demand. If the demand is higher than the lot capacity (i.e.,
M (1  F (~v)) > l) and yet customersvaluation of the good is su¢ ciently high (i.e., v  ~v),
then we assume that they decide to go to the shopping mall with the appropriate probability
so that exactly a mass l of customers visits the shopping mall with the aim to purchase the
good.
Assuming that customers randomize before visiting the shopping mall is a simplifying
assumption. This keeps ~v given in equation 2 unchanged. In Appendix A.2, we work out
two other reasonable alternatives. In the rst, all customers with v  ~v decide to go to the
shopping mall, but some will have to leave without shopping because they cannot nd a
parking space. In the second, among all customers with v  ~v only those who have higher
valuation of the good decide to go to the shopping mall. Under both of these alternative
specications, the key results of this section are qualitatively the same.
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3.1 Equilibrium
Given our assumptions, there are two possibilities: either all individuals who demand the
good can shop at the mall or the parking lot saturates and some customers do not visit the
mall. Therefore, the e¤ective demand for the shopping mall is min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l], and
consequently the expected demand, D(P; t; l), is
D (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l] dG (M) (22)
= (1  F (~v))
~MZ
M
MdG(M) + l
MZ
~M
dG(M) (23)
= G

~M

(1  F (~v))E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+

1 G

~M

l; (24)
where ~M(1 F (~v)) = l, and E[M jM  ~M ] represents the expected value of M for M  ~M .
Notice that if G( ~M) = 1, then this demand curve is the same as in Section 2. We provide
D (P; t; l) in three di¤erent forms, the rst of which is the raw form. It is easier to obtain some
derivatives of concern by using equation 23 and more intuitive to provide some expressions
in the form of equation 24. For future reference, note that DP =  f (~v)G( ~M)E[M jM 
~M ] < 0, Dt =  f (~v) ~vtG( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] < 0, and Dl = 1 G( ~M) > 0.6
The prot function of the mall is
 (P; t; l) = D (P; t; l) (P + t)  lc: (25)
Here, we subtract lc from the revenue because the cost of a parking lot is determined by the
size of the lot, not by how much of it is used. Notice that if there were no uncertainty then
6Although Dl looks like simply the derivative of the last term of D(P; t; l), we need some algebraic
manipulation to get this result. By using the derivation rule under integral sign in equation 23, we get
Dl = ~Ml ~M(1 F (~v))g( ~M)+1 G( ~M) g( ~M) ~Mll. Substituting for ~Ml = 1=(1 F (~v)) and l = M(1 F (~v))
yields Dl = 1 G( ~M). Similarly, the terms coming from the derivative of ~M in DP and Dt disappear because
~M is the upper bound in the rst integral of equation 23 and lower bound in the second.
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D(P; t; l) = l and this equation would be identical to the prot expression in the base model.
The prot maximization problem is still subject to similar rationality and non-negativity
constraints of the base model. It should be clear that l = M (1  F (~v)) only if c = 0,
because if l = M(1   F (~v)) then there is no benet of increasing the parking lot size. It
should also be clear that l > M(1   F (~v)) because otherwise D(P; t; l) = l and there is no
cost to raising the fees.
Setting P = t = 0 yields ~vP= = ~vt which means t =  r. Thus, once again, we
get t = 0. Given this, there is no problem in setting l = 0. The rst-order condition
with respect to l represents the marginal benet of an additional parking space minus the
marginal cost of it. The marginal benet is the probability that the parking space is used
times the revenue from that space if it is used. The probability is the probability M > ~M ,
or 1 G( ~M). This yields the equilibrium lot size:
l = G 1

1  c
P

(1  F (~v)) : (26)
Notice that another way of writing this condition is that G( ~M) = 1   c= (P ). From this
we can see that P  c, and one can show that the prot of the mall is positive when this
is true. Finally, the equilibrium price of the good is determined by the rst-order condition
with respect to P :
P  =
1  F (~v)
f (~v)
0@1 +

1 G

~M

~M
G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
1A ; (27)
and the equilibrium (P ; t; l) is unique.7 The following proposition summarizes the results
of this section.
7When there is no demand uncertainty, this price expression boils down to equation 8 of the base model.
First, recognize that E[M jM  ~M ] = ~M with no demand uncertainty. Then, using G( ~M) = 1   c=(P )
in equation 27 results in P  = [(1  F (~v)) (P )]=[f (~v) (P    c)]. After simple manipulation we arrive at
equation 8.
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Proposition 5 (Lot size model - equilibrium) If the demand to go to the shopping mall
varies, then
(i) the equilibrium price of the good satises equation 27,
(ii) the equilibrium parking fee is zero,
(iii) the equilibrium lot size is given by equation 26.
3.2 Welfare
Let us now turn to welfare analysis. Our main goal here is to gure out the criteria behind
imposing minimum parking requirements. Minimum parking requirements exist all over the
world. They specify the minimum amount of parking that must be provided by any land
use.
As in the base model, we dene welfare, W (P; t; l), as the sum of customersnet utility,
U (P; t; l), and the malls prot,  (P; t; l). The latter is dened in equation 25 and the
former is given by
U (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M
vZ
0
max [E (ujP; t) + (1  )u (w + r) ; u (w + r)] dF (v) dG (M) ; (28)
where E (ujP; t) is the expected utility given in equation 1, and  is the probability of visiting
the shopping mall, which we calculate next.
According to our assumptions, customers whose valuations are higher than ~v decide to
go to the shopping mall with the appropriate probability so that exactly a mass l of them
try to purchase the good. This probability is 1 when there is su¢ cient number of parking
spaces for all those with v  ~v. Otherwise, whenM > ~M , there will be only l parking spaces
but M (1  F (~v)) > l individuals who demand them. Therefore, the probability of visiting
the shopping mall should be l= (M (1  F (~v))) in this case. Both cases can be summarized
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with the following probability measure.
 =
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]
M (1  F (~v)) : (29)
The utility expression given in equation 28 deals with all possibilities at once. In the
cases in which the total possible demand is low (i.e., M  ~M),  = 1 and those whose
valuations of the good are higher than ~v visit the shopping mall and obtain E (ujP; t) in
expected terms while those whose valuations are less than ~v do not visit the shopping mall
and obtain their outside option u (w + r). In the cases in which the total possible demand is
high (i.e.,M > ~M), those whose valuations are less than ~v still do not visit the shopping mall
and obtain their outside option. However, this time, there are not enough parking spaces to
fulll the demand of those with v > ~v, and so each individual will go to the shopping mall
with probability  = l= (M (1  F (~v))). When this happens, by the Law of Large Numbers,
we expect to see exactly l individuals showing up in the parking lot.
We know that l (P; t; l) = 0 at the malls prot-maximizing choice of lot size. Thus, the
derivative of the welfare function with respect to the lot size at the prot-maximizing lot
size, denoted by Wljl=0, is simply Ul (P; t; l):
Wljl=0 = Ul =
MZ
~M
M
vZ
~v
E (ujP; t)  u (w + r)
M (1  F (~v)) dF (v) dG (M)
=

1 G

~M
 vZ
~v
E (ujP; t)  u (w + r)
1  F (~v) dF (v) > 0: (30)
Note that the outer integral in the rst line of the expression is over [ ~M; M ] because if the size
of the parking lot is non-binding then increasing the lot size has no impact on welfare. The
second line is easier to interpret. To understand it, note that customers are hurt only if the
size of the parking lot is binding, which occurs with probability 1 G( ~M). A customer with
value v loses E (ujP; t)  u (w + r) by not being able to shop, and since only the customers
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with values in [~v; v] su¤er this loss, the expected loss to one of these customers is the integral
term in the expression.
Equation 30 is of interest because it says that, given any price of the good and the parking
fee chosen by the mall, the full social optimum requires a larger parking lot size than the
market equilibrium. However, this requires price controls in addition to controlling the lot
size. If the social planner cannot control the price of the good, then it might well happen
that once it imposes a larger lot size, the mall increases its price, which certainly diminishes
or perhaps reverses the welfare-improving e¤ects of increased lot size. However, as shown in
Appendix A.1, this does not happen, because one of the implications of a concave objective
function is that @P=@l is negative. The reason for this is intuitive, if slightly opague. When
l is increased, the potential pool of customers is increased. This means that decreasing the
price by a small amount results in a larger increase in demand, and therefore the prot-
maximizing price is lower. Thus, the mall prefers decreasing its price of the good in response
to an increase in the lot size. This means that increasing the lot size improves welfare even
when the social planner cannot impose price controls. This leads to the following important
result.
Proposition 6 (Foundations of minimum parking requirements) If the demand to
the shopping mall varies, the lot size it chooses is smaller than the socially optimal lot size,
no matter whether or not the social planner controls the price of the good.
This is why local authorities may want to impose lower bounds on parking lot sizes.
To our knowledge, this proposition is the rst theoretical attempt to explore the micro-
foundations of minimum parking requirements. The intuition behind the result is straight-
forward. The social planner cares about the loss of utility of those who would like to purchase
the good but cannot. The mall cares only about the e¤ect of this on its prots. Thus, the
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social planner always wants a larger lot size. The equation for the optimal lot size, lo, is8
lo = G 1

1  c
P
+
Ul (P; t; l
o)
P

(1  F (~v)) ; (31)
which clearly shows that the social planner wants to increase the lot size to take into consid-
eration the loss of utility of the customers. The social planner can decentralize this solution
with appropriate taxes and subsidies.
We should note that if there were a social cost to parking,9 it could change this result,
which may potentially result in society wanting to impose a maximum parking lot size.
However, as Arbatskaya, Mukhopadhaya, and Rasmusen (2009) point out, this cost should
be subdivided into two costs, a ow cost and a cruising (or queuing) cost. The former is
a cost of tra¢ c congestion as individuals are going to the mall; the latter is the social cost
imposed by them searching for a parking space when they cannot nd one in the lot and by
having them come early to be sure to get a parking space. The social cost of ow should be
increasing in l, with a form like SCf (min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]) but the social cost of cruising
should be decreasing in l, with a form like SCc (max [M (1  F (~v))  l; 0]). Thus, whether
the net marginal cost of l is decreasing or increasing must be decided by balancing out these
two impacts.10
4 The Urban Mall
While the models in Sections 2 and 3 explain the situation for most shopping malls, they do
not capture two critical issues that malls may face in an urban area. We address these issues
here. First, in an urban area, individuals may want to use the malls parking lot for other
8For simplicity, in this characterization we assume society controls both the price and the lot size.
9Parking in typical suburban malls in the US does not interfere with tra¢ c very much.
10This argument implicitly considers the parking shortage model that we work out in Appendix A.2.1,
where anyone who wants to shop goes to the mall and parks if he can nd space.
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purposes to go to a park, restaurant, or store that is not in the shopping mall. Second, the
mall has a xed bound on the amount of space their property can take, so it has to decide
what share of that space to devote to parking. We think that this is more of an issue for
urban malls, as land is quite expensive in urban areas whereas it is negligible for suburban
malls that typically allocate very large asphalted lands for parking, which do not alter the
store size decisions.
In order to facilitate comparison with the base model, we analyze these two features
one at a time. Section 4.1 shows that if individuals want to use the parking lot for other
purposes, then the mall may want to charge positive parking fees. Section 4.2 shows that if
the mall has a trade-o¤ between parking and shopping spaces, parking is still provided for
free but society may want to impose minimum or maximum parking requirements depending
on the trade-o¤.
4.1 Positive parking fees
One question that has been left unanswered is why we observe positive parking fees in urban
areas. The base model considers a shopping mall that is primarily car dependent, like most
shopping malls in the US. In an urban mall, however, there may be individuals who have
no intention of shopping at the mall parking in the lot. They want to go somewhere in the
urban area that does not have its own parking lot and use the shopping malls lot because
they cannot nd more convenient parking elsewhere.
In this variation of model, customers will have two decisions to make: whether to go
to the urban area and whether to shop at the shopping mall. We continue to denote their
reservation value of not coming to the urban area with r. But now, individuals get an
additional payo¤ of n > 0 if they go to the urban area (but not to the mall). Therefore, their
reservation payo¤ becomes r+n. In order to achieve this value, they must park in the malls
parking lot and pay the parking fee t. We assume that n > c so that it can be protable
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to provide parking to non-shoppers. For simplicity, we further assume that if an individual
goes to the urban area, he can either shop at the mall or do some alternative activity, but
he cannot do both.
We start o¤ by showing that t > n cannot happen in any equilibrium. In such a case, all
those who park in the lot would be shoppers because u(w+ r+n  t) < u(w+ r). But then,
we immediately see that the mall would like to decrease the parking fee as much as possible
due to its insurancemotive in maximizing its prot. This means that the mall does not
want a parking fee higher than n. Thus, in any equilibrium, it must be that t  n in which
case all individuals go to the urban area because u (w + r + n  t)  u (w + r).
An individual shops at the mall if E (ujP; t)  u (w + r + n  t). The valuation of the
marginal customer in this case is
~v (P; t)  u 1

u (w + r + n  t)  (1  )u (w   t)


  w + P + t: (32)
For future reference, note that ~vP = 1 and ~vt = [(1 )u0(w  t) u0(w+ r+n  t)]=[u0(w+
~v   P   t)] + 1. It is no longer possible for us to nd a lower bound for ~vt, but we will show
that the parking fee should be set at n if ~vt  1=.
Since t  n, the shopping mall always has a parking demand of 1. Thus, the mall earns
t per customer and incurs a cost of c per each no matter what. Some of these individuals
using the lot shop at the mall and each of those leaves a revenue of P . This means that
the prot of the mall,  (P; t), is
 (P; t) = (1  F (~v)) P + t  c: (33)
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The rst-order conditions of the malls prot maximization problem are
P =  f (~v) ~vPP +  (1  F (~v)) (34)
t =  f (~v) ~vtP + 1: (35)
Then, the equilibrium price of the good is determined by
P  =
1  F (~v)
f (~v)
: (36)
Plugging this into the derivative with respect to t, we nd that t =   (1  F (~v)) ~vt +
1. Since 1   F (~v)  1, we know that t   ~vt + 1, and the left-hand side of this
expression is positive if ~vt  1=. This requires that (1  ) (u0 (w   t)  u0 (w + ~v   P   t))
 u0 (w + r + n  t). Since u00 < 0, we know that u0(w t) > u0(w+r+n t) > u0(w+~v P t)
> 0, and if individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse then it may be that u0(w  t)  u0(w+ ~v 
P   t) > u0(w + r + n  t). However, as  gets larger this condition is always satised, and
we nd that t = n. This should be considered as the normal case for our analysis. After
all,  is the probability that customers nd what they want at the mall. If it is too low,
then obviously the mall is doing something wrong. Achieving  = 1 may be infeasible but it
should be assumed to be close. This gives us the following result.
Proposition 7 (Positive parking fees) If the probability of customers being able to pur-
chase the good is high enough, then t = n.
Therefore, positive parking fees can happen in equilibrium if individuals are able to free
ride on the malls parking spaces. There is indeed a range of  values such that 0 < t  n.
Here, we focus only on t = n since it is su¢ cient to show the underlying reason for a
positive parking fee in equilibrium. To understand this result intuitively, rst notice that if
~vt  ~vP= = 1= then the mall is driving more customers away by increasing the price of the
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good than it is by increasing the parking fee. How is this done? When the mall increases the
parking fee, it also makes the outside option less desirable, in essence giving these individuals
more of an incentive to shop at the mall.
A clearer way to understand positive parking fees is to look at the three groups of
individuals who park in the lot. The rst group is the winnerswho shopped at the mall
and found what they wanted. This group is completely indi¤erent over all parking fees since
the malls pricing strategy guarantees that a higher parking fee is compensated with a lower
price of the good. The second group is the loserswho shopped and did not nd what they
wanted. They do not want to pay for parking since they are leaving empty-handed, and
because of its insurance motive, the mall does not want to charge them, either. This group
has a mass of (1  ) (1  F (~v)). Finally, unlike in suburban malls, there are non-shoppers
as a third group who only want to park. They have a mass of F (~v). The only way to get any
revenue out of non-shoppers is to charge a parking fee. As  gets large enough, the incentive
not to charge losers is outweighed by the incentive to charge non-shoppers.
One might notice that P and t are never a¤ected by the cost of providing a parking space
even if the probability of customers being able to purchase the good is not high enough.
This is because, as long as the mall decides to provide parking to all individuals, the cost
of providing parking is essentially xed, and like all xed costs it has no e¤ect on optimized
values. One may wonder why we assume that the mall can provide parking for all who want
it. A more complex model where n has a distribution would be necessary to analyze this
issue in depth, and this is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.2 Lot share: from too little to too much
In the base model, the mall is making four decisions. It chooses the price for the good,
the parking fee, the parking lot size, and the size of the shopping area. We have simplied
the analysis by ignoring the last of these choices, but clearly the benet of a larger store is
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that the probability that a customer nds the good that he wants increases. In an urban
area, increasing the size of the stores may require decreasing the size of the parking lot. We
investigate this trade-o¤ here.
We assume that the shopping mall occupies a xed amount of land and that the mall
is in a position to decide how to allocate this land between parking and shopping spaces.
Notice that in this model there must be vertical and horizontal limits on the size of the
property. The horizontal limits may be imposed because the cost of acquiring more land is
prohibitive. The vertical limit may be imposed by increasing costs as the building gets taller
or by government regulations.
We shall employ the simplest characterization of the trade-o¤ between space allocated to
parking and shopping. We assume that the shopping mall occupies a unit of land. Let the
share of land allocated to parking be s, and therefore the share of land allocated to shops is
1  s, where s 2 [0; 1]. We assume that increasing s decreases good varietyo¤ered, which
thus will decrease the probability that a customer nds the good that he wants. We assume
that  (s) 2 (0; 1) satises 0 <  (0) < 1,   (s) =s < 0 (s) < 0, 00 (s) < 0. That is, the
probability of nding the desired good at the shopping mall is a monotonically decreasing and
strictly concave function of s. The assumption that  (0) > 0 along with the assumption that
v is high enough guarantees that the solution is interior, and   (s) =s < 0 (s) guarantees
that the rst-order conditions are well behaved.
The marginal customer is now dened by
~v (P; t; s)  u 1

u (w + r)  (1   (s))u (w   t)
 (s)

  w + P + t: (37)
The maximization problem of the mall is
max
P;t;s
fmin [1  F (~v) ; s] ( (s)P + t)  csg : (38)
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Notice that in any solution, s = 1 F (~v), just like in the base model. If s < 1 F (~v), then
one can increase P or t without changing the quantity sold; and if s > 1   F (~v), then one
can decrease s without changing the quantity sold. Given this constraint, the maximization
problem can be rewritten as
max
P;t
f(1  F (~v)) ( (1  F (~v))P + t  c)g : (39)
The rst-order conditions of this problem are:
P =  f (~v) ~vP [(+ (1  F (~v)) 0)P + t  c] + (1  F (~v))  (40)
t =  f (~v) ~vt [(+ (1  F (~v)) 0)P + t  c] + (1  F (~v)) ; (41)
and like before in order for both of them to be equal to zero we need ~vP= = ~vt. The
di¤erence between the analysis in this section and in our base model is that the supply
of parking space is no longer perfectly elastic. The mall trades o¤ increased lot size with
decreased good variety. This is the reason for the appearance of 0 (s) in the equations above.
If one assumes that 0 (s) = 0 then the rst-order conditions are identical to those in the base
model (equations 5 and 6). This is equivalent to increasing the lots size until the impact of
s on  (s) is negligible.
Given the equilibrium condition s = 1   F (~v), the formulas for ~vP and ~vt are more
complicated than before:
~vP =
u0 (w + ~v   P   t)
 0f (~v) [u (w + ~v   P   t)  u (w   t)] + u0 (w + ~v   P   t) > 0 (42)
~vt =
(1  )u0 (w   t) + u0 (w + ~v   P   t)
 0f (~v) [u (w + ~v   P   t)  u (w   t)] + u0 (w + ~v   P   t) > 0: (43)
One can still show that in order for ~vP= = ~vt, t must be equal to  r, thus t = 0 is the
implementable solution.
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Proposition 8 (Land allocation trade-o¤) Free provision of parking is an equilibrium
even when the mall faces a land allocation trade-o¤.
Finding the equilibrium value of P is straightforward. We will not spend space analyzing
it, other than to say that it exists and is unique. Instead, we immediately turn to welfare
analysis. As before, welfare is dened as the sum of customersutility and the malls prot.
The malls prot is given by equation 39 and the customersutility is
U (P; t; s) =
Z v
v
max [E (ujP; t; s) ; u (w + r)] dF (v) ; (44)
where
E (ujP; t; s) =  (s)u (w + v   P   t) + (1   (s))u (w   t) : (45)
The welfare maximizer does not have to satisfy the constraint s = 1  F (~v), other than
respecting the fact that if s < 1   F (~v) then P will be adjusted to satisfy this constraint
and if s > 1  F (~v) then the rm will treat the share of land devoted to parking as a xed
cost. This means that what we are interested in is Ws around the optimal level of s and
P , at which point s = 0. Thus, the derivative of the welfare function with respect to s at
the prot-maximizing share of land allocated to parking, denoted by Wsjs=0, simply equals
Us (P; t; s):
Wsjs=0 = Us =
Z v
~v
EsdF (v)
=
Z v
~v
[0 (s) (u (w + v   P   t)  u (w   t))] dF (v) < 0: (46)
This equation says that, in general, society wants the parking lot to be smaller. However,
this is confounded by the fact that no matter what the relationship between s and 1 F (~v),
@P=@s  0 and as before WP jP=0 = UP =   (s)
R v
~v
u0 (w + v   P   t) dF (v) < 0. Thus, if
society imposes a smaller parking lot, the mall will increase the price of the good and this will
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decrease welfare. Therefore, society may not be able to improve welfare by imposing a smaller
parking lot without also controlling the price of the good. If, however, @P=@s is su¢ ciently
small, then the welfare gain due to decreased parking lot size outweighs the welfare loss due
to the increase in the price of the good. Even if P is set by competitive considerations, it
will probably still be that @P=@s < 0, because the marginal cost of shopping area is almost
surely higher than the marginal cost of a parking lot. Thus, increasing the parking lot size
decreases the marginal cost and thus the price of the good. This gives the key result of this
section.
Proposition 9 (Maximum and minimum parking requirements) Society may want
a larger or smaller parking lot than the shopping mall. If @P=@s is small, then it always
wants a smaller parking lot.
This explains the maximum parking requirements that have been imposed by some cities
around the world. Notice, however, that these regulations are justied when there is a
trade-o¤ between land devoted to parking and shopping. If this trade-o¤ is negligible (as in
suburban malls) or there is a way to change regulations to remove this trade-o¤, then we are
back in the model of Section 3.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have now taken a rst step toward understanding what stores want the price and quantity
of parking to be. In the case of the shopping mall where the parking provider and the store
are united we nd that shopping malls want parking to be free. We further nd that society
also wants parking to be free, and it wants the shopping mall to provide more than the
prot-maximizing amount of parking. The main analysis ignored the congestion externality
of parking. We feel that it is best to rst understand how the shopping mall would operate
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independent of these concerns before taking them into consideration. But, when we consider
the social cost of parking in a reduced-form manner, we nd that society still wants parking
to be free, though it may not want to impose minimum parking requirements.
The main message of this paper is not that parking fees should be zero but that the cost
of parking should be absorbed in the price of the good. It is not that parking fees are bad
but that raising the price of the good is better than raising the parking fee. Free provision
of parking is a surprisingly robust result. It holds if the mall provides vouchers, prices in a
competitive manner, and even if it has a trade-o¤ between space for shopping and parking.
This result changes when individuals want to use the malls parking lot for other purposes,
or if they use it purely as a parking garage. In this case, the mall will recognize this and
generally want to raise revenue from these individuals. This explains the observation of
positive parking fees in urban malls.
In a model where customers buy heterogeneous goods or more than one unit, the mall
could use a parking fee to increase its prots. Many malls that have parking fees do seem to
use this form of second-degree price discrimination having a di¤erent parking fee depending
on how much you buy, which store you shop at (like movie theaters), etc. Another form of
second-degree price discrimination is to charge di¤erent parking fees to short-time parkers
than long-time parkers. In the face of these incentives, it is surprising that a vast majority
of malls do not have parking fees, and our paper provides a rationale for this practice.
We have provided one coherent theory of shopping mall parking. Obviously, other market
forces may strengthen our results. For example, transaction costs associated with parking
may prevent positive parking fees being charged. However, this explanation is lacking in
several dimensions. First, with increased automation, transaction costs should be decreasing,
and thus we should see more malls charging parking fees but we do not. Second, most of
these transaction costs would be based on the hourly wages of employees. Hence, we should
see more parking fees in areas with large turnover. In contrast, many urban malls have no
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parking fees even when they have high tra¢ c. Third, most US towns and cities have minimum
lot-size requirements. If parking was being systematically under-priced in malls, then surely
governments should be decreasing the supply of parking; instead they force shopping malls
to have larger than privately optimal lots. Our model can explain this phenomenon, while
transaction-cost theory cannot.
In a competitive environment, the mall may use free parking as a loss leaderto attract
customers. There are two reasons that we do not think this is as fundamental as our approach.
First, this argument relies almost completely on the competitive nature of the shopping mall,
suggesting that less competitive malls should be more likely to charge parking fees. The
empirical evidence is exactly the reverse: in general it is urban malls that charge parking
fees, where the competition between malls is ercest. Our model explains this phenomenon,
while the loss-leader argument does not. Second, in our model free parking is socially optimal,
while a loss leader is at best welfare neutral.
Another alternative approach is to analyze the problem as a two-sided market (Rochet
and Tirole, 2003) in which the shopping mall is a platform that has to attract both stores
and customers. In equilibrium, it may well happen that the mall embeds the costs of parking
in the rents as a xed cost and this would not change the pricing decisions of stores, which
means that they cannot pass on the costs of parking to the customers. We did not take this
approach in order to simplify our exposition. The simplest version of a two-sided market
model would have both the store and the shopping mall be monopolists, but this would
lead to the double markup problem from the vertical integration literature. In our model,
we assume the e¢ cient solution to this problem, merging the mall and the store. A more
complex model would require store-specic demand curves and a careful analysis of the
structure of competition between the stores. While this is an excellent topic for future
research it is too complicated to be pursued here.
This paper is one of the rst to justify the standard practice of imposing minimum park-
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ing requirements on shopping malls. In some popular press and planning circles, minimum
parking requirements are deemed to be the worst planning rules. We, on the other hand,
neither want to dismiss them altogether nor do we endorse blindly supporting and mechan-
ically applying them to any land use. Our results are specic to shopping mall parking and
they show that there is a sound basis for minimum parking requirements in this context.
However, if there is a signicant social cost (due to tra¢ c congestion) from parking, towns
and cities may want to impose maximum parking rather than minimum requirements. They
may also want to do this if stores face a binding constraint on the amount of land that their
property can utilize, because then they may have to sacrice shopping area to increase the
parking area.
We do not claim that our results apply to all forms of parking, and we believe that towns
and cities should avoid one-size-t-all policies. Di¤erent parking fees and requirements must
be imposed for di¤erent land uses and in urban versus suburban areas. We believe that more
theoretical work on the foundations of parking policies, and empirical work quantifying the
e¤ects of those polices, is required. Given the surprising robustness of free parking, the
natural next question is how society should price parking in urban areas. Does society want
the external costs of congestion to be reected in the price of goods rather than the parking
fee? Under what conditions will it want to charge for parking? Could it possibly want to
use hourly parking fees to increase business for urban stores despite the fact that this will
increase congestion? How do the results change in the presence of public transportation and
modal choice? These questions are left to future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of dP=dl < 0
The equilibrium price is given by equation 27. Modifying this expression gives
 = [f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))]G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

~M = 0: (A.1)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
dP
dl
=   @=@l
@=@P
: (A.2)
Let us rst derive @=@l:
d
dl
= (f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))) ~Mg

~M

~Ml   (1  F (~v))

~Ml   ~MlG

~M

  ~Mg

~M

~Ml

= ~Ml

(f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))) ~Mg

~M

  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

  ~Mg

~M

= ~Ml

f (~v)P ~Mg

~M

  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

: (A.3)
Substituting for P from equation 27 yields
d
dl
= ~Ml (1  F (~v))
0@ ~Mg  ~M+

1 G

~M

~M2g

~M

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i   1 G ~M
1A
= ~Ml (1  F (~v))
0@ ~Mg  ~M+

1 G

~M
 h
~M2g

~M

 G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
ii
G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
1A ;
(A.4)
where ~Ml = 1=(1   F (~v)) > 0. Remember that we assume g(M) > 0 and 1 < Mg(M)
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for all M 2 [M; M ], which implies that G( ~M) < ~Mg( ~M) because G( ~M)  1. Multiplying
the left-hand side by E[M jM  ~M ] and the right-hand side by ~M does not change this
inequality since 0 < E[M jM  ~M ] < ~M . Hence, g( ~M) ~M2   G( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] > 0.
Consequently we get
d
dl
> 0: (A.5)
Now, consider @=@P :
d
dP
= [f 0 (~v)P + 2f(~v)]G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ [f (~v)P   (1  F (~v))] ~Mg

~M

~MP
 
h
 f(~v)

1 G

~M

  g

~M

~MP (1  F (~v))

~M + (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

~MP
i
= [f 0 (~v)P + 2f(~v)]G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ f (~v)P ~Mg

~M

~MP + ~Mf(~v)

1 G

~M

  (1  F (~v))

1 G

~M

~MP ;
(A.6)
where ~MP = ( ~Mf(~v))=(1  F (~v)). Hence,
d
dP
= [f 0 (~v)P + 2f(~v)]G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ f (~v)P ~M2g

~M
 f (~v)
1  F (~v)
=f 0 (~v)PG

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ 2f(~v)G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
+ f (~v)P ~M2g

~M
 f (~v)
1  F (~v)
=P

G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
f 0 (~v) + g

~M

~M2
f 2 (~v)
1  F (~v)

+ 2f(~v)G

~M

E
h
M jM  ~M
i
> 0: (A.7)
From the monotone hazard rate property we know that
f 0 (~v) +
f 2 (~v)
1  F (~v) > 0: (A.8)
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Multiplying the rst term of this expression with G( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] and the second term
with g( ~M) ~M2 does not change the inequality because ~M2g( ~M) G( ~M)E[M jM  ~M ] > 0.
Then, we conclude that
d
dP
> 0: (A.9)
Finally, equations A.5 and A.9 imply that dP=dl < 0, which means that if the lot size is
increased the SMO will decrease its price.
A.2 Alternative Models of Parking-lot Size
In this appendix, we show that the key result of Section 3 holds under alternative rationing
rules. The key result we are interested in is that society still wants a larger parking lot than
the shopping mall in a full social optimum. In our base model, we assume that if the parking
lot is too small then all customers randomize before they go to the shopping mall so that
only an l mass of customers shows up. One may think that assuming that customers know
the total potential mass of demand is too strong of an assumption. This would give rise to
the model in Appendix A.2.1. In this model, all customers go to the mall and some do not
nd a parking space. Alternatively, one may be interested in the socially e¢ cient mechanism
of only having the highest-value customers shop. This is the model in Appendix A.2.2. In
both of these cases, we show that our key result holds.
A.2.1 Parking shortages
If everyone always goes to the mall and only some nd a parking space, this is similar to
reducing . Now, the customer is able to buy the good only if he goes to the shopping
mall and if there is an available parking space. Given M , the probability of parking is
 = min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l] = (M (1  F (~v))).
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Note that
l =
8><>:
1
M(1 F (~v)) > 0 if l < M (1  F (~v))
1 if l M (1  F (~v))
; (A.10)
and
P =
8><>:
lf(~v)
M(1 F (~v))2 > 0 if l < M (1  F (~v))
0 if l M (1  F (~v))
: (A.11)
Now, ~v is directly a¤ected by l and M :
~v = u 1

u (w + r)  (1  )u (w   t)


  w + P + t; (A.12)
and ~vl = (l=2) [u (w   t)  u (w + r)] =u0 (w + ~v   P   t), which is strictly negative when
l > 0.
Given that t = 0, the prot of the mall is
 (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]dG (M) P   lc: (A.13)
The rst-order conditions of malls prot maximization are
P =  f (~v) ~vPP
MZ
M
MdG (M) + P
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]PdG (M)
+ 
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l]dG (M) (A.14)
l =  f (~v) ~vlP
~MZ
M
MdG (M) + P
MZ
M
min [M (1  F (~v)) ; l] dG (M)l
+ P
MZ
~M
dG (M)  c: (A.15)
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Equation A.15 has two new positive terms, resulting in a larger optimal parking lot. The
welfare expression will be changed by this. Like before, we only need to analyze the net
utility, U (P; t; l), which is given by
U (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M
vZ
0
max [u (w + v   P ) + (1  )u (w) ; u (w + r)] dF (v) dG (M) :
(A.16)
The derivative of welfare with respect to l at the prot-maximizing lot size is
Wljl=0 = Ul =
MZ
~M
M
vZ
~v
(u (w + v   P )  u (w)) ldF (v) dG (M) > 0: (A.17)
So, we still conclude that a social planner prefers a larger parking lot than the mall in the
full social optimum.
A.2.2 Asymmetric sorting
In another alternative model, instead of everyone going to the parking lot, only the highest-
value customers go to purchase the good when the demand is too high, or the critical value
for the mall, vas, is
vas =
8><>: F
 1  1  l
M

if M (1  F (~v)) > l
~v if M (1  F (~v))  l
; (A.18)
where ~v is given by equation 2. Note that vasl =   (1=M) (F 1)0 < 0 if vas > ~v.
The prot of the mall is
 (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M (1  F (vas)) dG (M) (P + t)  lc: (A.19)
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Again, after letting t = 0, the rst-order conditions of malls prot-maximization are
P (P; t; l) =  
~MZ
M
Mf (~v) dG (M) P + 
MZ
M
M (1  F (vas)) dG (M) = 0 (A.20)
l (P; t; l) =

1 G

~M

P   c = 0; (A.21)
where again ~M (1  F (~v)) = l. l (P; t; l) is the same as it is in the original model and thus
we get the same value for l. However, like before, the net utility is di¤erent. In this case, it
is more convenient to break the customers into two groups, one of which is able to purchase
at the given level of M and P :
U (P; t; l) =
MZ
M
M
24 vZ
vas
[u (w + v   P ) + (1  )u (w)] dF (v)
35 dG (M)
+
MZ
M
M
24 vasZ
0
u (w + r) dF (v)
35 dG (M) : (A.22)
The critical derivative is the derivative of welfare with respect to l at the prot-maximizing
lot size:
Wljl=0 = Ul =
MZ
~M
M [(u (w + vas   P ) + (1  )u (w)  u (w + r)) ( vasl ) f (vas)] dG (M) > 0:
(A.23)
So, once again, we get the same result; the social planner desires a larger parking lot than
the mall in the full social optimum.
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